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AN APPLE A DAY KEEPS SHAREHOLDER
SUITS AT BAY: AN EXAMINATION OF A
CORPORATE OFFICER'S LEGAL DUTY
TO DISCLOSE HEALTH PROBLEMS
TO SHAREHOLDERS
By Alexis Brown Stokes'
ABSTRACT

This Article examines both constitutionaland practicalproblems with proposed regulation to require corporate officers to disclose health problems to
shareholders. In doing so, the Article addresses the following questions,
which are especially timely given the recent controversy surrounding Apple
CEO Steve Jobs: To what extent should officers of public companies be required to disclose personal health problems to shareholders? Does a timely
failure to disclose such information constitute securitiesfraud if the stock price
is adversely affected once the information becomes public? Can shareholders'
rights to accurate information relevant to a company's likely future performance trump an officer's right to privacy? To what extent do the answers to
these questions depend on how closely the officer's identity is aligned with his/
her brand, i.e., how "iconic" the officer is perceived to be? Are these issues
for regulatorsto addressex ante or the courts to handle ex post? And in either
case, can an objective rights-balancingframework be developed?
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INTRODUCTION

On February 9, 2000, internet rumor-mongers launched an apparent
short-and-distort scheme on Berkshire Hathaway. 2 Alleging that
1. Assistant Professor of Business Law, McCoy College of Business Administration, Texas State University-San Marcos. J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Rice University. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to the Southern Academy of
Legal Studies in Business in March, 2010 and the International Academy of Legal
Studies in Business in August, 2010. The author thanks Lauren Bungo for her research assistance and Peter Stokes and Charlene Robertson for their support. All
errors, omissions, and opinions in this article belong solely to the author, who can be
reached at as44@txstate.edu.
2. ALICE SCHROEDER, THE SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS
OF LIFE 690-91 (2008).

303

DOI:byhttps://doi.org/10.37419/TWLR.V17.I3.2
Published
Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

1

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 17 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 3

304

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway's iconic founder and chairman,
was hospitalized in critical condition, the internet rumors spread
quickly, spurring a heavy sell-off of the company's stock,' known in
trading circles as a "mortality play." 4 Buffett, healthy at the time,
countered with a press release asserting his good condition.'
The rumors, however, foreshadowed an actual health crisis Buffett
experienced just a few weeks later.6 After a hospital stay for kidney
stones'-during which Buffett used an alias'-doctors discovered
large benign polyps in his colon.' At sixty-nine, and the son of a father who had died from colon cancer, Buffett had no choice but to
undergo colon surgery.io With surgery came the need for another
press release:
Warren Buffett, Chairman of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (NYSE:
BRK.A, BRK.B), expects to enter an Omaha hospital in the next
month to undergo surgery to remove several benign polyps in his
colon. The polyps were discovered on Monday when Mr. Buffett
underwent a routine physical examination, which otherwise found
him to be in excellent health. The surgery is expected to keep Mr.
Buffett in the hospital for several days, after which he expects to
return quickly to work. Berkshire Hathaway is releasing these facts
to forestall the kind of false rumors about Mr. Buffett's health that
disrupted the market for its stock earlier this year. 1'
For the infamously private Buffett, such public revelations about his
health were embarrassing but essential given the perception of his "indispensability" to Berkshire Hathaway.12 As Buffett said nine years
later, "If I have any serious illness, or something coming up of an important nature, an operation or anything like that, I think the thing to
do is just tell the American, the Berkshire shareholders about it. I
work for 'em. Some people might think I'm important to the company . . . so it's a material fact .

. .

. They're going to find out about it

anyway so I don't see a big privacy issue or anything of the sort."1 3
But is there "a big privacy issue" at stake? Should officers of public
companies be required to disclose personal health problems to share3. Id. at 691.
4. Betsy Schiffman, When a CEO Coughs, Do Shareholders Catch a Cold?,
WIRED.COM (June 12, 2008), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2008/06/apple-saysstev/. "Reverse mortality plays" occur when the CEO is sick, may have to step down,
and the stock goes up. Id.
5. SCHROEDER, supra note 2 at 691-92.
6. Id. at 694.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 695.
9. Id. at 700.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 700-01 (citing Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (June 21, 2000),
available at http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/jun2100.html).
12. Id. at 691.
13. Interview by Becky Quick with Warren Buffett, in New York, NY (June 24,
2009) availableat http://www.cnbc.com/id/31526815/.
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holders? Does a timely failure to disclose such information constitute
securities fraud if the stock price is adversely affected once the information becomes public? Can shareholders' rights to accurate information relevant to a company's likely future performance trump an
officer's right to privacy? To what extent do the answers to these
questions depend on how closely the officer's identity is aligned with
his/her brand, i.e., how "iconic" the officer is perceived to be? Are
these issues for regulators to address ex ante or the courts to handle
ex post? And in either case, can an objective rights-balancing framework be developed? This Article attempts to address these questions,
which are especially timely given the recent controversy surrounding
Apple CEO Steve Jobs.

II. DiscussIoN
A.

Topicality of Health Disclosure Debate

To some investors, Steve Jobs is to Apple what Warren Buffett is to
Berkshire Hathaway. Considered "irreplaceable," Jobs is credited
with Apple's turnaround in the last decade and maintains significant
personal control over the company.14 And like Buffett, Jobs has kept
most aspects of his personal life private. Jobs's health first became an
issue in 2004, when he announced that he had been diagnosed with,
and treated for, a rare form of pancreatic cancer." Jobs, and the Apple Board of Directors, allegedly knew of the diagnosis for more than
nine months before disclosing it to Apple employees and investors. 16
As Apple's officers and directors "secretly agonized over the situation-and whether the company needed to disclose anything about
[Jobs's] health to investors," Jobs employed alternative health and
diet methods in an effort to avoid surgery." Only when those methods failed did Jobs elect to have the surgery, and only after the surgery
was successful did Jobs alert the rest of the world to his medical
news." Apple did not disclose any additional information about Jobs'
health, "citing the CEO's need for privacy."'
Health questions resurfaced in June 2008, when Jobs appeared unusually thin while introducing the iPhone 3G at Apple's annual
Worldwide Developers Conference.20 Apple responded that Jobs had
only been struck by "a common bug" and that "Steve's health is a
14. Peter Elkind, The Trouble with Steve, FORTUNE, (Mar. 17, 2008), http://money.
cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies/elkind-jobs.fortunelindex.htm.
15. E-mail from Steve Jobs to Apple employees, (Aug. 2, 2004), available at http://
appleinsider.com/documents/jobs email_080204.txt.
16. Elkind, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Joe Nocera, Apple's Culture of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2008, http://www.
nytimes.com/2008/07//26/business/26nocera.html.
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private matter," although sources leaked that Jobs had undergone a
surgical procedure and had developed an infection. 2 1 After Jobs announced that he would not give his annual keynote address to the
Macworld conference in January, 2009,22 the rumors about his health
reached a fever pitch and drove Apple's share price down 2.5 percent.2 3 To help calm investors, on January 5, 2009, Jobs issued a letter
to the "Apple Community" in which he claimed that his dramatic
weight loss the previous year was due to a hormone imbalance-a
"nutritional problem" for which the remedy was "simple and straightforward." 24 He emphasized that he would continue as Apple's CEO
and that he would "always put what is best for Apple first." 2 5 A week
later, Jobs released another statement, only saying that his health situation was "more complex" than he originally thought and that he
would be taking a leave from the company; shares fell 8 percent. 26
Then, in June 2009, Apple disclosed that Jobs had received a liver
transplant two months earlier. 27 No additional information was released, leaving investors wondering. In the meantime, Apple's stock
value has quadrupled. 28
In January 2011, Jobs announced he would take a third medical
leave from Apple, and once again, he declined to share details of his
condition with investors. 29 Apple's share price slid by 2.3 percent the
next trading day, but then recovered only one day later when Apple's
strong quarterly results were released.3 0 As this article goes to press,
it remains unclear whether or when Jobs will return to Apple.
Jobs's privacy assertions are not unusual amongst Fortune 500
CEOs. For example, Jimmy Cayne, the former chairman of Bear
Stearns, hid his hospitalization for, and near death from, a prostate
infection during the credit crisis because he feared that news of his
illness would cause Bear Stearns stock to crash.
When its CEO,
21. Id.
22. Jobs Won't Deliver Macworld Keynote, Apple Shares Off, REUTERS, Dec. 17,
2008, available at http://in.reuters.comlarticle/idINN1628730620081216.
23. Id.
24. Letter from Steve Jobs, CEO, Apple, to The Apple Community (Jan. 5, 2009),
available at http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2009/01/05sjletter.html.
25. Id.
26. Ben Rooney, Apple's Jobs to take medical leave, CNNMONEY.COM, Jan. 14,
2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/14/technology/apple-jobs/index.htm.
27. Steve Jobs Recovering After Liver Transplant,CNN.com, June 23, 2009, http://
www.cnn.com/2009/US/06/23/steve.jobs.liver.transplant/index.html.
28. See http://quotes.wsj.com/AAPL#.
29. Apple Media Advisory (Jan. 17, 2011), available at http://www.apple.com/pr/
library/2011/01/17advisory.html.
30. Rachel Beck & Barbara Ortutay, Apple Secretive About Steve Jobs' Health,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/19/stevejobs-health_n_810797.html.
31. Stephen Foley, Cayne Admits He Was Ill Amid Bear Stearns Crisis,THE INDEPENDENT (Aug. 5, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/cayneadmits-he-was-ill-amid-bear-stears-crisis-885303.html; William Cohan, The Rise and
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Bruce Wasserstein, was hospitalized with heart problems over a weekend in October 2009, Lazard released a statement saying only that
Wasserstein was "serious but stable;" Wasserstein then died three days
later.32 In June 2010, after rampant speculation about her health,
Brenda Barnes, chair and CEO of Sara Lee, acknowledged she had
had a stroke "a few weeks ago" and promised an update on her condition in two months.3 3 In August 2010, Barnes stepped down permanently to focus on her health.3 4 TLC Beatrice, which was closely held,
disclosed that its CEO, Reginald Lewis, had brain cancer only when
he fell into a coma, the day before he died." In 1995, when Intel
CEO Andrew Grove was diagnosed with colon cancer, he informed
the company's board and management but did not disclose the matter
to shareholders." When CEO Roger Deromedi was hospitalized in
2004, Kraft Foods only informed shareholders that Deromedi had an
'undiagnosed medical condition," which later turned out to be a virus
and dehydration that required a month's recovery; Kraft defended its
vague disclosures as striking "the right balance between informing investors about Roger's illness and at the same time respecting his
privacy."
On the other hand, some executives have chosen to disclose medical
problems quickly after diagnosis. For example, Tenneco, Inc. almost
immediately alerted shareholders to CEO Michael Walsh's brain tumor diagnosis in 1994.38 McDonald's CEO Charlie Bell disclosed in
May 2004 that he would be undergoing surgery for colorectal cancer;3 9
the company then provided frequent updates on Bell's health until he
died eight months later. 4 0 Also in 2004, Clear Channel timely disclosed that its CEO, Lowry Mays, underwent emergency brain surgery.4 1 Most recently, in October 2010, AIG disclosed that CEO
Fall of Jimmy Cayne, CNNMONEY.COM, Aug. 4, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/07/
31/magazines/fortune/rise and-fallCayne-cohan.fortuneindex3.htm.
32. William D. Cohan, Bruce Wasserstein's Last Surprise, VANITY FAIR (May
2010), http://www.vanityfair.com/business/features/2010/05/wasserstein-201005.
33. Steve Gelsi, Sara Lee CEO Recovering From a Stroke, WALL ST. J., June 14,
2010, http://www.foxbusiness.com/story/markets/industries/retail/sara-lee-ceorecovering-strokel.
34. Chris Burritt & Matthew Boyle, Sara Lee CEO Barnes to Resign After Suffering Stroke, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 9, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-09/
sara-lee-ceo-barnes-to-resign-after-medical-leave-smits-interim-chief.html.
35. Phyllis Plitch, Illness at top presents issues over disclosure; Some say investors
have a right to know when executives are sick, THE TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), June
1, 2004, 2004 WLMR 729230.
36. Nocera, supra note 20.
37. Plitch, supra note 35.
38. Id.; Charles Boisseau & David Ivanovich, Illness Forces Tenneco's Walsh to
Resign Top Job, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 25, 1994, 1994 WLNR 4961370.
39. Cancer Surgery for McDonald's CEO, FORBES (May 6, 2004), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/id/4915433.
40. Beck & Ortutay, supra note 30.
41. Tara Murphy, Mays Seen Recovering from Brain Surgery, Forbes.com (May 4,
2004), http://www.forbes.com/2004/05/04/cx tm_0504video2.html.

Published by Texas A&M Law Scholarship, 2022

5

Texas Wesleyan Law Review, Vol. 17 [2022], Iss. 3, Art. 3

308

TEXAS WESLEYAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

Robert Benmosche was undergoing chemotherapy for cancer but was
continuing to work;42 two days later, AIG announced a review of its
succession plan in case Benmosche's health status changes. 4 3 In January 2011, AIG disclosed Benmosche's "encouraging prognosis" and
said the CEO is expected to remain at AIG "on his previously announced timetable" with retirement anticipated in 2012.44
Perhaps Jobs's situation is unique-one analyst has speculated that
a Jobs's departure would translate into a $20 billion-plus loss for Apple, as the corporation is essentially a "one-man show" 45 and Jobs is
considered "synonymous" with the Apple brand,46 the corporation's
"heart, soul, and creative center."4 7 But are the majority of investors
really so unsophisticated as to believe that a successful brand will fall
apart without its CEO at the helm? At Apple, for example, Jobs is
known as a micro-manager, but product design, daily operations, and
marketing are directed by other, well-known executives.4 8 Even if
Jobs abruptly departed Apple for health-related reasons, the company's intrinsic value would not deteriorate in the short-term, or
maybe even in the long-term, although the stock price (as an inexact
proxy for value) certainly might fall due to reactionary sell-offs by
nervous investors.4 9 By comparison, in the wake of Martha Stewart's
conviction and imprisonment for obstruction of justice in the ImClone
stock sale investigation, most customers continued to support the
Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia brand; sales of some products
even increased.50 As another example, Microsoft stock did not suffer
42. AIG Press Release on Benmosche's Health Condition, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 25,
2010), http://blogs.wsj.com/dispatch/201 0/1 0/25/aig-press-release-on-benmoscheshealth-condition/.
43. Shira Ovide, Read AIG's CEO Succession Plan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2010/10/27/read-aigs-ceo-succession-plan/.
44. AIG Updates Health Condition of CEO Bob Benmosche, AIG, INc. (Jan. 24,
2011), http://ir.aigcorporate.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=76115&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=15
19234&highlight=.
45. See Elkind, supra note 14.
46. See Michael Learmonth, et al., Can Brand Apple Still Thrive Without the
Iconic Steve Jobs?, 80 ADVERTISING AGE 4, Jan. 19, 2009, 2009 WLNR 1374600;
Nocera, supra note 20 (quoting analyst Charles R. Wolf: "Apple is Steve Jobs and
Steve Jobs is Apple"; "he is the single most indispensable chief executive on the
planet.").
47. Harvey L. Pitt, Rules for Disclosing a CEO's Unexpected Absence, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Feb. 24, 2009), http://www.complianceweek.com/article/5279/rules-fordisclosing-a-ceos-unexpected-absence.
48. Learmonth, et al., supra note 46.
49. See Nocera, supra note 20 (quoting analyst Charles Wolf: "I think the stock
would drop 25 percent or more if he were to leave the company unexpectedly."). But
see Learmonth, et al., supra note 46 (noting that Apple, however, only saw its shares
drop $1.95 to $83.38 the day after Jobs announced his six-month medical leave, causing doubt about the so-called "Jobs premium" in Apple's stock price.).
50. See Regina Molard, Taking Stock of Martha, LICENSE! June 2004, at 184-85
("With the Martha Stewart brand, the value of the brand established over time could
transcend the reputation of the individual, which has been tarnished due to recent
events." (quoting Peter Greene)).
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market losses either when chairman Bill Gates announced his departure two years in advance, or when he actually retired, in large part
because "he [was] signaling very clearly that he was going to have an
orderly transition from leadership of the company." 1 As one commentator has noted, "one measure of how well a CEO has done is the
indifference with which the market takes his leaving."5 2
The Jobs discussion leads to a larger point, however: Should an investor's decision based on a single executive's leadership be legally
protected at the expense of that executive's privacy? Put another way,
must a company disclose an executive's potential, or newly diagnosed,
health problems or risk a securities fraud lawsuit if the stock tanks
when that executive suddenly steps down or dies due to those health
problems? Before this, and the other questions posed in the introduction, can be addressed, though, the current legal framework must be
reviewed, and the assertion of a fundamental right to privacy over
health issues must be examined.
B.

Current Legal Frameworkfor Disclosure

Currently, there are no specific legal guidelines for corporations to
follow in deciding when, how, and what to disclose regarding executive health problems.5 There is not even a requirement that health
conditions "likely to impair continued performance of an executive"
be disclosed.5 4 Instead, SEC Rule 10b-5 only requires disclosure of
"material" information and prohibits misleading investors. In compliance with Rule 10b-5, companies must complete Form 8K, 6 which
alerts shareholders to events that may have a material effect on the
51. Gates' Departure Could Boost, Not Bust, Microsoft, ABCNews.com, June 16,
2006, http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/Business/story?id=2084015&page=1.
52. James Surowiecki, Is Bill Gates Dispensable as CEO?, SLATE.COM (Jan. 14,
2000), http://slate.msn.com/id/1004376/.
53. See, e.g., Pitt, supra note 47; Tom Krazit, Steve Jobs' Health Now a Public
Matter, CNET NEWS, Jan. 5, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/steve-jobs-health-now-a-public-matter/; see also Arik Hesseldahim, The SEC Is Too Lax on CEO Health Disclosure, BUSINESS WEEK (June 24, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/technology/
content/jun2009/tc20090624_212886.htm ("As things now stand, Securities & Exchange Commission rules are exceedingly vague about what a company should disclose about the health of a C-level executive official, and how soon that disclosure
should be made.").
54. Melissa Lee, Should CEOs Have to Disclose Health Problems?, CNBC (July
10, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13805436/ (quoting Duke University Law
Professor James Cox).
55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951) ("It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of
the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange . . . (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they
were made, not misleading . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security").
56. Form 8-K, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf (last visited Oct.
23, 2010).
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company, including the retirement, resignation, firing, or other departure of principal officers, and the hiring and firing of new ones.
Clearly, then, companies must inform shareholders when an officer is
no longer able to continue in his role; beyond that, the law requires a
judgment call to be made: Does a corporate officer's illness affect the
company in a material way? As to what "material" means, the Supreme Court has ruled that "an omitted fact is material if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it
important in deciding how to vote."" The issue of materiality is a
mixed question of law and fact, requiring "delicate assessments of the
inferences a 'reasonable shareholder' would draw from a given set of
facts and the significance of those inferences to him."5 9 In practice,
this means companies often employ a balancing test and weigh the
"magnitude of the event (the possible death of a CEO, the negative
outcome of litigation)" against the probability of that event occurring.6 0 Although the SEC is reportedly investigating Apple's failures
to disclose accurate and timely information about Jobs' health,6 1 thus
far, no reported case has addressed whether a corporate officer's failure to disclose a health problem to shareholders violates Rule 10b-5.6 2
The resulting uncertainty over whether and when an executive's
medical condition is "material" to the company, coupled with a perception that the SEC has been "too lax" in policing failures to disclose
health problems, have led many analysts and scholars to call for
"stricter, clearer guidelines."6 3 As one commentator argues, "Company shareholders have a right to know when an executive's life hangs
57. Hesseldahlm, supra note 53.
58. TSC Indus. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The Court continued, "It
does not require proof of a substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact
would have caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the standard
does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations
of the reasonable shareholder." Id.
59. Id. at 450.
60. Schiffman, supra note 4.
61. Harvey Silverglate, The SEC Should Leave Steve Jobs Alone, WALL ST. J.,
(Feb. 2, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123353490166937699.html; Roger
Parloff, Why the SEC is Probing Steve Jobs, FORTUNE, (Jan. 22, 2009), http://money.
cnn.com/2009/01/22/technology/stevejobs disclosure.fortune/index.htm; see also
Nocera, supra note 20 ("No company has ever been held to account by the S.E.C. for
failing to disclose information about its chief executive's health.").
62. Cf In re Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02-CV-6273
(JES), 2002 WL 32495905 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2002). Shareholders sued alleging MSO
executives misled investors by issuing materially false and misleading statements regarding the risks to MSO and to its company brand as a result of damage to Martha
Stewart's reputation during/after the government's investigation into her 2001 sale of
ImClone stock. Id. The case eventually settled for $30 million but raised questions
about whether a company's failures to publicly disclose risks regarding an iconic officer constituted fraud under 10b-5. Id.
63. See, e.g., Hesseldahlm, supra note 53.
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in the balance."64 By extension, shareholders also want to be able to
sue when an executive's failure to disclose leads to the stock tanking
upon that executive's unexpected death or departure. Shareholders
do not like bad surprises, and the current regulatory regime preserves
the ability of executives to keep adverse information private until it is
potentially too late to avoid such a surprise.
Thus, the urge to craft more stringent and enforceable regulation is
sympathetic. Enron's demise birthed calls for greater transparency
and more meaningful corporate governance. Sarbanes-Oxley, the initial response to such calls, is credited with improving the quality of
corporate disclosureS65 and the accessibility of information to investors. Amidst widespread economic uncertainty and skepticism about
corporate officer honesty, Steve Jobs's health periodically dominates
the news cycle. Understandably, investors, and many practitioners
and scholars, seek the regulatory comfort of bright-line rules defining
when executive illness must be disclosed to shareholders and when
failure to do so constitutes fraud.6 6 The dilemma for regulators is how
to craft a more specific rule without running afoul of the Constitution's implicit privacy protections.
C.

Right to Privacy in Health Matters

Privacy, it is often noted, is not explicitly guaranteed in the Constitution. Our founders lived in a simple, largely agrarian society without the intrusions of modern day urbanization or technology.
Expressly defining a privacy right likely struck constitutional drafters
as unnecessary. As our society, and its media, grew in complexity,
legal scholars began defining privacy boundaries. In 1890, Louis
Brandeis and Samuel Warren argued for "a right to be let alone."6 7 In
1960, William Prosser identified privacy interests against public disclosure of embarrassing facts about an individual and against intrusion
upon a person's private affairS6 8-together, a rudimentary foundation
for informational privacy. In 1967, Alan Westin described privacy as
the ability to determine for ourselves how, when, and to what extent
information about us is communicated to others.6 9 In 1995, Caroline
Kennedy and Ellen Alderman claimed that "[p]rivacy allows us to
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact
of SOX 404, 29 CARDOzo L. REV. 703, 716 (2007).
66. One way the SEC might clarify guidelines for disclosure without additional
rulemaking is through an interpretative release, similar to what was done for climate
change issues. See SEC, COMMIsSION GUIDANCE REGARDING DISCLOSURE RELATED TO CLIMATE CHANGE: 17 C.F.R. §§ 211, 231, 241 (2010), http://www.sec.gov/
rules/interp2010/33-9106fr.pdf.
67. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L.
REV. 193, 195 (1890).
68. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
69. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM (1967).
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keep certain facts to ourselves if we so choose.""o In 1998, Jerry Kang
argued that "an individual's control over the processing-i.e., the acquisition, disclosure, and use-of personal information" was a core
component of privacy.7 '
For their part, however, the federal courts have been more tentative
in defining privacy rights. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution provides for a "right to privacy" in
the "penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. 72 Justice Douglas further described "zones of privacy" created by Constitutional guarantees. In
Stanley v. Georgia,the Court declared that it is a "fundamental" right
"to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy." 74 In Roe v. Wade, the Court
applied the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review to determine
whether a violation of Roe's fundamental privacy right was constitutionally justified.7 1 In Whalen v. Roe, the Supreme Court more specifically recognized an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters" 7 6-the first declaration of a constitutional right to
informational privacy. Three years later, in United States v. Westinghouse Electric, however, the Third Circuit noted that "the right of an
individual to control access to his or her medical history is not absolute."77 In Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, the Third Circuit elaborated
"that the right to medical privacy .

.

. is legally cognizable under the

Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, although ... its 'boundaries ... have not been exhaustively delineated.' "78 The Third Circuit
concluded that "the question of the scope of the constitutional right to
privacy in one's medical information is largely unresolved."7 9
Despite the judiciary's reluctance to define the inclusions and limits
of privacy rights, today, a right to informational privacy is assumed in
American culture and codified through both federal and state legislation.so For example, the Privacy Act of 19741 governs the collection,
maintenance, use, and dissemination of personally identifiable infor70. ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY (Alfred
A. Knopf Inc., 1995).
71. Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV.
1193, 1202-03 (1998).
72. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
73. Id.
74. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
75. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
76. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 (1977).
77. United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3rd Cir.
1980).
78. Citizens for Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 177 (3d Cir. 2005).
79. Id. at 177 n.10.
80. See generally Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
477, 528 (citing numerous state and federal laws protecting against "disclosure of information from government records, school records, cable company records, video
records, motor vehicle records, and health records").
81. See Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
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mation about individuals that is maintained in federal agency records.
The Privacy Act explicitly prohibits the disclosure of information
without the written consent of the individual, unless the disclosure is
pursuant to one of a dozen statutory exceptions.
Another example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), required the Secretary of Health and
Human Services to issue privacy regulations governing individually
identifiable health information. In August 2002, HIPAA's Privacy
Rule was finally effected, with the following purpose:
A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to assure that individuals' health
information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health
information needed to provide and promote high quality health care
and to protect the public's health and well being. The Rule strikes a
balance that permits important uses of information, while protecting
the privacy of people who seek care and healing. 82
In short, the Privacy Rule recognizes that the right to health information privacy, while extensive, is not absolute and may be limited by
public health concerns and the need for efficiency in the health care
system."' This is in keeping with the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
standard, which requires that any restriction of a fundamental right be
justified by a compelling government interest like public health or national security, be narrowly tailored to advance that interest, and go
no further than necessary to achieve that interest. HIPAA passes the
strict scrutiny test. The question is whether a regulation requiring corporate executives to disclose health issues to shareholders would also
be constitutional. For the following reasons, the answer is no.
D.

The Constitutionaland PracticalProblems with Crafting a
Health Disclosure Regulation

If privacy is a fundamental right, and the option to keep health
problems to oneself an exercise of that right, then any bright-line regulation requiring corporate executives to disclose health problems
would have to pass constitutional muster. In considering a constitutional challenge to a disclosure regulation, courts would initially inquire as to whether the law meets the state action requirement, as
summarized by the Third Circuit in Leavitt:
Actions challenged on constitutional grounds fall somewhere along
a continuum, with direct action by the State on one side and action
by a "private party not acting against a backdrop of state compulsion or involvement" on the other. Whereas the former meets the
state action requirement for constitutional claim, the latter does
82. Office for Civil Rights Privacy Brief Summary of the HIPAA Privacy Rule,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaal
understanding/summary/privacysummary.pdf (last updated May 2003).
83. See Citizens for Health v. Thompson, No. 03-2267, 2004 WL 765356, at *13
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2004).
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not.... along this continuum, the enactment of a state law "requiring" violation of individual rights, and "enforcement" of such a law
establish the requisite state action . . . . "A State is responsible ...

when the State, by its law, has compelled the act" or when the State
has "commanded" a particular result. 84
In the proposed health problem disclosure regulations discussed
herein, no one is suggesting that the government should act directly
and disclose corporate executives' medical records. However, compelling private citizens to sacrifice their own privacy rights by disclosing personal information-"commanding a particular result" of
disclosure-meets the state action test under Leavitt. True, an executive could resign from his job rather than consent to disclosure of his
health problems, but coercing the executive to relinquish his privacy is
equivalent to compelling the same result.
After establishing state action, the courts would next likely apply
the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, and goes no further
than necessary to accomplish this objective." The "compelling state
interest" motivating regulation here is debatable, as the Supreme
Court has declined to define a list of such interests. 86 Generally,
shareholder access to accurate and timely information about issuers
helps ensure that stock prices are not overinflated, thus avoiding a
bubble burst when adverse information is finally released or leaked.
The efficient flow of information is thus essential to market stability,
and by extension, to the economic security of the United States. Economic security is fundamental to national security. The Supreme
Court has determined national security to be a "compelling state interest."" Thus, while protecting the individual pocketbooks of investors is not a compelling state interest," there are indirect
macroeconomic benefits to ensuring that issuers are transparent about
issues affecting their performance, and these benefits may translate to
greater national security. Just as efficiency of the public health systems justifies HIPAA's balance of privacy rights and disclosures, the
84. Citizens of Health v. Leavitt, 428 F.3d 167, 180 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168-70 (1970)).
85. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("Where certain 'fundamental rights'
are involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified
only by a 'compelling state interest'. . .and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."). But see Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Philadelphia, 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987) ("Most
circuits appear to apply an 'intermediate standard of review' for the majority of confidentiality violations . . . with a compelling interest analysis reserved for 'severe intrusions' on confidentiality.").
86. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917
(1988).
87. See e.g., Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944).
88. See generally Gottlieb, supra note 86, at 952-53.
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efficiency of the financial markets may justify regulation compromising individual privacy rights.
However tenuous this reasoning, it comports with an economic
analysis of the law perspective. Judge Richard Posner contends that,
in the labor market, employees are offering themselves as goods."9
Just as companies must disclose defects in goods to avoid fraud, employees must disclose defects in themselves. 90 Such disclosures promote market efficiency, as market participants are then able to make
more fully informed decisions. 91 Posner thus argues against a right to
keep private information relevant to job performance.9 2 Such a privacy right would impede market efficiency. 93 Although Posner's theory pertained to the disclosure of information by employees to
employers, there is an analogous relationship between executives (employees) and investors (the "owners" or indirect "employers").
Market efficiency only occurs when participants have access to perfect information, however, and even if executives disclosed every
health issue known to them, there might still be health issues unknown or undiscovered, in addition to other non-health risk factors
both within and beyond the company's control that could damage its
market value. The Supreme Court has thus not made a habit of compromising fundamental privacy rights in a quest for market efficiency.
Even if there is a compelling state interest at stake in requiring executives to disclose health problems, the government would still have to
prove that the regulation is narrowly tailored and the least restrictive
means to advance that compelling state interest. This is where pragmatic policy concerns come into play.
As a practical matter, any effort to craft regulation mandating that
corporate leaders disclose health problems must: first, specify who
must disclose; second, clarify exactly what information must be disclosed; and third, specify when the disclosure must be made. Such
specificity is necessary to avoid the judgment calls (and corollary defenses to non-disclosure) that make the current 10b-5 framework difficult to enforce in this context.
First, regulators must determine who should be bound by health
disclosure rules. This requires an assessment of whose privacy rights
are outweighed by shareholders' rights to accurate information about
the companies in which they invest, as well as an understanding of
which corporate leaders wield the biggest influence on their companies' value and share price. Most regulatory discussions and suggestions have focused on CEOs. But should a rule apply to CEOs only,
89. Richard Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REv. 405, 405
(1981).

90. See id. at 406.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
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and not to CFOs, COOs, CIOs, or creative officers, even if these other
executives are instrumental to their companies' successes or failures?
This question alone underscores the challenges in drafting a brightline rule for mandatory health problem disclosure.
In focusing on the need for CEO health disclosures, one commentator observes that "CEOs today have become highly compensated
leaders and stars .

. .

. the CEO [is] the center of attention, like a top

contender at the Kentucky Derby. The CEO who wants responsibility
and huge compensation loses privacy.""

Even amongst Fortune 500

CEOs, however, "huge" compensation is relative95 and star-status is
not a universal truth. Importantly, it is troubling to suggest that there
is a financial tipping point at which Americans lose their fundamental
constitutional rights-that once one makes a certain amount of
money, those rights are no longer guaranteed. Indeed, the Supreme
Court rejected analogous reasoning in Citizens United, when it held
that "political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker's wealth" 96
and that the "First Amendment's protections do not depend on the
speaker's 'financial ability' to engage in public discussion."" Further,
while no studies have yet examined the household name recognition
of Fortune 500 CEOs (much less the recognition of CEOs of smaller
public companies), common sense and anecdotal evidence suggests
that most investors cannot name the CEO of every company in which
they own stock. At best, the Wall Street analysts who study companies and make investment recommendations for their clients likely
identify and understand particular CEOs' contributions to their firms,
and then include those considerations in their value assessments, but
those analysts should also be savvy enough to understand a company's
big picture and not overreact when there is a sudden executive departure." Indeed, a recent study found that private equity firm analysts
are more concerned with "bench depth," or management quality one
or two levels below the CEO. The reality is that many CEOs of publicly traded companies are more comparable to maiden race horses"
than to Kentucky Derby contenders.
94. Melissa Lee, Should CEOs Have to Disclose Health Problems?, MSNBC.com,
(July 10, 2006), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/13805436/ (quoting shareholder activist
Nell Minnow: "When you become the CEO, one of the luxuries you must relinquish is
the luxury of privacy.").
95. See Scott DeCarlo, Special Report: What the Boss Makes, FORBES.COM (Apr.
28, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2010/04/27/compensation-chief-executive-salaryleadership-boss-10-ceo-compensation-intro.html.
96. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905 (2010).
97. Id. at 904 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 1976)).
98. Investors Identify Their 7 Top Concerns Relative to Succession Planning, INrEGRAL ADVISORS, L.L.C. (2010), http://www.integraladvisorsllc.com/investorsuccess
ion.pdf.
99. Maiden race horses are horses that have yet to win a race. The races are generally run for younger more inexperienced horses at two and three. http://encarta.
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So does the workaday executive have the same obligations to disclose personal health issues as does the Jobs-like superstar? Ethically,
such a distinction between executives who are not iconic and those
who are, makes sense-if a corporate leader uses his identity, reputation, and personality to sell the company's brand,100 then with that
might come a reasonable expectation and understanding of "public
figure" status and its corresponding loss of privacy. A comparison
could be made, for example, between a higher disclosure standard for
public-figure CEOs and the higher burden of proof for public figures
0 Legally, however, a discriminatory disclosure
in defamation cases.o'
scheme-one in which iconic corporate leaders must disclose but runof-the-mill officers do not-is untenable for both practical and policy
reasons. Practically, such a scheme would be impossible to regulate ex
ante and difficult to enforce ex post. Rulemakers would have an impossible task in delineating the difference between executives who are
inextricably intertwined with their company's success and those who
are less so; any assessment of an executive's relative importance
would subjectively rely on the company's judgment.' 02 Further, if
such a rule were implemented and litigated, one could imagine the "I
am not really as important as you think I am" defenses offered by
executives sued for non-disclosure of health problems. From a public
policy perspective, implementing disclosure rules dependent on how
critical an executive is to his company would send a message that the
better job one does, the less privacy to which one is entitled. This
would create a disincentive for charismatic leadership and also induce
talented executives who value privacy to work in private firms or
other sectors of the economy instead. In the current economy, where
msn.com/encnet/features/dictionary/DictionaryResults.aspx?lextype=3&search=maid
en.
100. See, e.g., Edwin Colyer, Lights, Camera, Action: CEO in the Spotlight,
BRANDCHANNEL.COM (April 14, 2003), http://www.brandchannel.com/features-effect.
asp?id=152 ("[D]ynamic CEOs become intrinsically linked to the companies they represent .

.

. CEOs are part of a company's brand equity -

the leader reflects the

company.").
101. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 289 (1964) (holding that the First
Amendment "prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory
falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not").
102. See Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill:
When Is a Corporation Obligated To Disclose that Illness and Should the Securities
and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. &
Bus. 827, 868-69 (2009) (proposing required disclosures by "a director of, employee
of or independent contractor . . . who performs functions on behalf of or for the
registrant that are not, at the time of the determination of impairment or substantially
likely impairment, provided to the registrant by any other person, are fundamental to
the financial performance of the registrant and, in the good faith judgment of the
registrant, could not be performed by anyone currently employed by or retained by
the registrant" and noting that this definition affords "the company some leeway . ..
in deciding who is a luminary").
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talented leadership is more needed than ever, this would not be an
acceptable result.
Statutorily framing an executive's legal obligation to disclose health
issues as a matter of degree of celebrity or luminosity,' 0 3 then, does
not work. Any regulation would need to apply to all CEOs of publicly-traded corporations. If that is the case, then the argument that
CEOs are "stars" or "celebrities" who ought to accept the corresponding trade-off with privacy fails, because as discussed above, most
CEOs are not celebrities, even to their own shareholders. Further, a
CEO of a small-caplO4 company could legitimately argue that the violation of his particular privacy rights does not advance a compelling
state interest of market stability because even if he suddenly died and
his company fell apart, the effect on the macro-economy would be
insignificant. Even large-cap 05 company CEOs might make the same
argument, as it is often difficult to prove a causal connection between
a company's failure (for whatever reason) and larger economic downturn. By analogy, the Tenth Circuit, in considering the constitutionality of a statute creating a semi-closed primary system that restricted
freedom of association out of a purportedly compelling state interest
in political stability, observed: "We grant that a state has a compelling
interest in general political stability, but the fact that neither Utah or
Alaska has collapsed under the weight of its allegedly destabilizing
primary system calls into question whether Oklahoma's interest in political stability is implicated under these circumstances."' 0 6 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit concluded that Oklahoma's statute was not
narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest.' 0 7 In short, a
rule forcing all public company CEOs to disclose health problems
would be overbroad and fail the narrowly-tailored test because the
government likely could not prove that most CEOs' failures to disclose private health information cause market instability or economic
insecurity. Alternatively, regulators would also be challenged to delineate objectively and fairly which types of companies-based on
market capitalization, value, or industry-should be required to disclose executive health problems, and which should not. Likely attempts at regulation would be too broad, or too narrow, and never
constitutionally justified.
103. See id. at 853 (describing an iconic CEO, or "luminary," as "someone who is
especially integral to the success of the enterprise, such that her continued active,
energetic involvement is necessary to the ongoing business of the company").
104. "Small-cap" generally refers to market capitalization of less than $1 billion.
Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the number of a company's outstanding shares by its stock price per share.
105. "Large-cap" companies generally have a market capitalization value of more
than $10 billion.
106. Beaver v. Clingman, 363 F.3d 1048, 1060 (10th Cir. 2004), rev'd on other
grounds, 544 U.S. 581 (2005).
107. See id.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol17/iss3/3
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V17.I3.2

16

Stokes: An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: An Examination of

2011]

AN APPLE A DAY

319

Even if a regulation specifically and appropriately specified who
must disclose health information to shareholders, the second and third
questions are what type of information must be disclosed, and when.
One group of commentators argues for mandatory disclosure of
"any illness or condition which (1) immediately endangers the life of
the CEO; (2) requires a lengthy absence; (3) shortens-or has the potential to shorten-the lifespan of the CEO; or (4) impacts the CEO's
ability to reliably perform his or her job function."10 8 The biggest
problem with this regulatory prescription is the overbroad third criteria-requiring disclosure of "any illness or condition" that "has the
potential to shorten the lifespan of the CEO." Litigious shareholders
could seize upon the vast scope of such a rule and sue executives who
fail to disclose common "conditions"' 09 like epilepsy,"o high blood
pressure,"' high cholesterol,' 12 heart disease,1 13 smoking addiction,"
diabetes," celiac disease, 6 diets high in red meat," 7 rheumatoid arthritis,"' vision impairment,"' high levels of Vitamin E, 12 0 a history of
108. Alexa A. Perryman et al., When the CEO Is Ill: Keeping Quiet or Going Public?, 53 Bus. HORIZONS 21, 23 (2010), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/
Perryman justifies this
B6W45-4X9D5FN-1/2/c38c571803babalb71f450076b79f3b6.
regulatory framework by comparing CEOs with American presidents. These comparisons are inapposite. An American president's job performance affects every American citizen, and, post-election, American citizens cannot "opt out" of the president's
governance. Investors, however, have a choice on a daily basis, and enter the market
understanding the uncertainty and risks associated with investment. In addition, history provides numerous examples of American presidents, including Kennedy, Lincoln, and Reagan, who did not disclose health problems. Even presidents are not
legally required to disclose their health concerns.
109. "Condition" may include a state of physical fitness or general health, a physical disorder, a general state or mode of existence. See Condition Definition, ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (North American Edition), http://encarta.msn.
com/dictionary_/condition.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2010).
110. See Sudden Unexplained Death in Epilepsy (SUDEP), NYU COMPREHENSIVE
EPILEPSY CTR., http://www.med.nyu.edu/cec/epilepsy/sudep.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2011).
111. See Robert Clarke et al., Life Expectancy in Relation to CardiovascularRisk
Factors:38 Year Follow-Up of 19,000 Men in the Whitehall Study, 339 BRIT. MED. J.
b3513, b3513 (2009).
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Diabetes May Shorten Life Span by 12 Years, UPI.com, Mar. 16, 2004,
http://www.upi.com/ScienceNews/2004/03/16/Diabetes-may-shorten-life-span-by-12years/UPI-12411079464108/.
116. See generally Jonas F. Ludvigsson et al., Small-Intestinal Histopathology and
Mortality Risk in Celiac Disease,302 JAMA 1171 (2009) (discussing the mortality rate
for celiac disease).
117. See generally Rashmi Sinha et al., Meat Intake and Mortality: A Prospective
Study of Over Half a Million People, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 562 (2009) (discussing an association between red meat intake and an increase in total mortality).
118. See R. Myllykangas-Luosujarvi, et al., Rheumatoid Arthritis Shortens Life, 111
FINLAND 1209 (1995).
119. See generally Michael J. Karpa et al., Directand Indirect Effects of Visual Impairment on Mortality Risk in Older Persons: The Blue Mountains Eye Study, 127
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stress,121 jet lag, 122 and even boredoml 2 3-all of which have the "potential" to shorten lifespan but do not necessarily affect an executive's
ability to perform his job for the foreseeable future. To avoid such
lawsuits for non-disclosure, executives would be over-burdened, both
in terms of time releasing information so frequently and voluminously, and in potential embarrassment (from disclosure of conditions
carrying social stigma). Perhaps worse, some executives may decide
not to seek medical advice or tests in the first place, out of fear that
any potentially negative findings would have to be publicly disclosed.
This would raise decisional privacy concerns as well as informational,
because, as the Supreme Court suggested in Whalen, by creating a risk
of disclosure, health care decisions might be inhibited.12 4 Consequently, any health disclosure rule propagated by the SEC must be
more narrowly tailored than the framework proposed above.
Another commentator suggests that when a company knows a key
executive is "suffering from a physical or mental illness that substantially impairs or is substantially likely within two years to substantially
impair the capability of the [executive] to perform the functions on
behalf of or for the benefit of the [company] which the [company] has
represented in any public disclosure that the [executive] is performing," the company "will disclose the fact of the current or substantially
likely impairment if that impairment has or is substantially likely to
have a material adverse impact on the company."1 25 This proposal
requires disclosure in more narrow circumstances; however, as this
commentator acknowledges, the two-year time frame is arbitrary, and
the determination of what is "substantial" requires judgment calls by
both the company and the medical doctors.126 Accordingly, it is unclear how this proposal significantly improves upon the current 10b-5
materiality rule, which already relies on the company's judgment call.
Even requiring disclosure of only life-threatening or terminal conditions would be problematic. First, what constitutes a "terminal" condition varies by state law, and federal regulators would be challenged
to define "terminal" consistently. Second, the diagnosis of a "termiARCHIVES OPTHALMOLOGY

1347 (2009), http://archopht.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/127/

10/1347.
120. See Edgar R. Miller et al., Meta-Analysis: High-Dosage Vitamin E Supplementation May Increase All-Cause Mortality, 142 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 37, 39 (2005).
121. See David W. Brown, et al., Adverse Childhood Experiences and the Risk of
Premature Mortality, 37 AM. J. OF PREVENTIVE MED. 389, 395 (2009).
122. See A.J. Davidson et al., ChronicJet-Lag Increases Mortality in Aged Mice, 16
CURRENT BIOLOGY R914 (2006), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1
635966/pdf/nihms-13349.pdf.
123. See Annie Britton & Martin J. Shipley, Bored to Death?, 39 INT'L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 370 (2010), http://ije.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/dyp404v1.pdf.
124. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
125. Horwich, supra note 102, at 867-68.
126. See id. at 869.
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nal" condition does not necessarily imply that death is imminent, 12 or
that job function will be impaired in the foreseeable future. 128 And as
above, any determination of what is terminal or life-threatening depends on subjective assessment by medical professionals and simply
transfers the judgment call regarding disclosure from the company to
the doctor, potentially leading to "doctor shopping" in an effort to
avoid disclosure.
It is also unworkable to mandate a general disclosure of "a health
problem" without requiring the sharing of specifics. Vague and general statements about poor health only increase speculation, uncertainty, and market instability, thus undermining the very "compelling
state interest" sought to be advanced. Further, because Rule lOb-5
expressly prohibits misleading statements, once a company does decide to disclose an executive's health problem, the truth must be
told.129
In addition, any regulation requiring corporate executives to disclose health problems creates a slippery slope in which any possible
risk to the executive's life or job functionality may become fair game
for public knowledge. Choices of hobbies, companions, travel destinations, and diets may all be scrutinized, and worse, litigated, as potentially "material" to the executive's ability to perform, and
correspondingly, to the company's success.
Even if regulators could develop a framework for determining what
specific health information must be disclosed, there is still a question
of timing, of when the disclosures need to be made-Immediately
upon initial diagnosis? After receiving a second opinion? After determining treatment options or lack thereof? After treatment? After
a reliable long-term prognosis has been calculated? Only immediately
before death? Disclosing illness too early may cause more insecurity
and instability in the markets, as investors do not know whether to
plan for the worst or hope for the best. A preliminary diagnosis of an
executive's pancreatic cancer-which the public knows to be typically
fatal-could shock investors into a massive sell-off of the company's
stock, for example, whereas a later announcement that additional testing shows the pancreatic cancer to be of an usually rare and curable
kind, would not. But disclosing illness too late-when the executive is
near-death-would have a similar shocking effect and create concern
among investors as to the company's lack of forthrightness on other
127. For example, a "persistent vegetative state" is a "terminal condition," but a
person in such a state could live for decades more.
128. For example, the Veterans Administration hospital guidelines have broadly
defined "terminal illness" to include "chronic debilitating conditions from which there
is no reasonable hope of recovery." These conditions include arthritis and mental
illness, which, in milder forms and/or when treated with medication, would not necessarily impair job function.
129. Roger Parloff, Why the SEC is Probing Steve Jobs, CNNMONEY.COM, January
22, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/22/technology/stevejobs-disclosure.fortune/.
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issues as well. Timing of disclosure is critical to eliciting the most rational and stable investor response, and yet, developing a bright-line
regulatory rule is nearly impossible.
III.

CONCLUSION

These constitutional and practical concerns underscore the difficulty in drafting more specific disclosure regulation. Ultimately, then,
the disclosure of personal health information should be left to the ethical discretion of the corporate executive and the board of directors,
all of whom have fiduciary duties to act in the best interests of the
company. Unless the executive is unable to perform his job functions
and/or plans to step down, in which cases disclosure is required on
Form 8K under Rule 10b-5, it should be the company's choice how
much information to disclose, and when to disclose it. That decision
calculus should include consideration of how iconic/indispensable the
executive is to his company but also weigh the prognosis for recovery,
the demands of treatment, the time for which the executive will be
away, the capabilities of the second-in-command, and other subjective
value judgments about the extent to which the executive's job func-

tionality will be impaired. Ethical business leaders understand that
they owe their stakeholders accurate and timely information about
their company's performance and plans, and many already voluntarily
share personal information about their health matters. 3 0 But with the
exception of Jobs and the SEC investigation into possible misleading
statements made by Apple regarding his health, there is no empirical
evidence that the current judgment-based disclosure scheme is broken, and thus, no compelling reason to compromise executives' personal privacy rights through over-regulation.
Further, the bandwagon to increase disclosure regulation is based
on the assumption that some investors make their decision to invest
based on the leadership of a particular executive, and that information
about that executive's likely future performance or tenure would be
material to their decision to buy or sell stock. Regardless of how
iconic or luminous that executive may be, why should such over-reliance on a single corporate leader be protected? With so much uncertainty in the market and no guarantees, ever, as to outcome, such
single-issue investment decisions are naive at best, and the popular
mantra of caveat emptor certainly applies. Compromising fundamental privacy rights to assuage investors caught up in a cult of personality
(even when that cult is encouraged by the company) is not reasoned
or justified policy-making.
130. One negative implication of such voluntary disclosures must be noted, however, in that they may establish reliance expectations that a particular executive will
always share health concerns, and that no news is good news.
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The consideration of an executive's privacy rights does not have to
mean that good corporate governance is compromised, however. A
better regulatory approach consistent with good corporate governance
principles would be to require every public company to develop a
clear succession plan, ideally one that is communicated to investors.
Announcements of succession plans are not easy as such plans may
''create internal competition for the role or tension among those who
were not chosen."' 3 ' "Revealing secret plans" may also "provide rivals with an unfair advantage" and "make it harder to retain executives." 1 32 In addition, given that "it is most [iconic] CEOs' primary
succession concern, and their boards' biggest nightmare" as to
whether "a leader can hand off a prized intangible such as cult of personality," 133 succession plans also do not ensure the continued success
of the brand, as they did not in the cases of Charles Schwab, Dell, and
Starbucks,'134 but then, nothing does. Economic factors and changes
in consumer preferences can undermine even an iconic CEO's leadership. Further, although evidence indicates that the stock market reacts negatively to sudden CEO death announcements,1 3 5 to date, no
studies have shown a causal connection between an iconic CEO's departure and a long-term negative effect on share price. That said, succession plans do help assure investors that the company has
considered and prepared for the eventual mortality or departure of
their CEO,1 36 while also reminding those investors that the corporation and brand are distinct from the current CEO's personality and
leadership."' After all, executive tenure is never certain, as other job
opportunities, family issues, retirement, and under-performance may
all cause an executive to leave a position prematurely. "Eventually all
131. Tom Krazit, Steve Jobs' Health Now a Public Matter, CNET NEWS, (Jan. 5,
2009), http://news.cnet.com/steve-jobs-health-now-a-public-matter/.
132. Adam Satariano, Apple Challenged by Investors on Jobs Succession Planning,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/
In Feb2011-02-23/apple-challenged-by-investors-on-jobs-succession-planning.htm.
ruary 2011, some Apple investors sought public disclosure of the company's succession plans; the measure was not approved. Id.
133. Holly Sraeel, Can a Leader Pass Down His Cult of Personality?, 114 U.S.
BANKER, Mar. 2004, at 8, 8.
134. Michael Liedtke, Sequels to Iconic CEOs Rarely as Good as Original,
FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 15,2009, http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2009Janl 5/0,4670,Apple
CEOSuccession,00.html.
135. Dan L. Worrell et al., Management Turnover Through Deaths of Key Executives: Effects on Investor Wealth, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 674, 676 (1986).
136. Wallace N. Davidson III et al., Ignoring Rules of Succession: How the Board
Reacts to CEO Illness Announcements, 23 J. Bus. STRATEGIES 93, 109 (2006).
137. Jennifer Reingold, Jobs' Saga Raises CEO Disclosure Issues, CNNMONEY.
coM, Jan. 15, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/01/15/news/companies/jobs-disclosure.
fortune/index.htm ("in Apple's case, while Tim Cook has stepped ably into the job,
the company has never - until now - given him the formal attention and support
that might remind investors that Apple has been successful because of Jobs' leadership, yes, but also because of the thousands of brilliant executives and employees
below him.").
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leaders leave, and it's incumbent upon every company to make sure
that all key stakeholders understand the quality and depth of the team
behind them." 3 ' As an added benefit, analysts like Moody's, Standard and Poor's, and Risk Metrics, include succession planning factors
in their ratings.'13
In conclusion, while calls for more transparency via more stringent
disclosure rules are sympathetic, such privacy-compromising regulation would be problematic when judged both by the Supreme Court's
strict scrutiny standard and by common sense pragmatics. Additional
regulation would be overly burdensome on privacy rights and likely
also encourage frivolous litigation based on over-interpretation of the
rule. Instead, shareholders should exert pressure on boards to execute their fiduciary duties faithfully by carefully considering the material impact of executive health problems, and push for better
succession planning by all public companies.
138. Learmonth et al., supra note 46.
139. Integral Advisors, LLC, Investors Identify Their 7 Top Concerns Relative to
Succession Planning (2010), available at http://www.integraladvisorslc.com/investor
succession.pdf.
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